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	<title>Comments on: Why We Don&#8217;t Use CSC Codes</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/</link>
	<description>Tales From the Inside!</description>
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		<title>By: Card Credit Order Processing Information &#187; Blog Archive - &#8230; because in theory somebody would have to physically have the card i</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-8532</link>
		<dc:creator>Card Credit Order Processing Information &#187; Blog Archive - &#8230; because in theory somebody would have to physically have the card i</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jul 2006 22:48:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-8532</guid>
		<description>[...] DreamHost Blog &#8221; Why We Don&#8217;t Use CSC Codes [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] DreamHost Blog &#8221; Why We Don&#8217;t Use CSC Codes [...]</p>
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		<title>By: DreamHost Blog &#187; Why We Do Use CSC Codes</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-3744</link>
		<dc:creator>DreamHost Blog &#187; Why We Do Use CSC Codes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Apr 2006 06:19:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-3744</guid>
		<description>[...] What a difference six months makes! [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] What a difference six months makes! [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Dmitriy</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-1979</link>
		<dc:creator>Dmitriy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2005 09:04:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-1979</guid>
		<description>It is very interesting!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is very interesting!</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-918</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Sep 2005 21:55:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-918</guid>
		<description>My bad.  Verisign STILL has not fixed their certificate problem.  https://www.verisign.net/
You may say &quot;so what,&quot; we know it&#039;s them.  But DO you?  Man in the middle attack, phishing attacks, etc... it&#039;s crazy stuff.  But what&#039;s sad is that it just adds to &quot;training&quot; people to ignore such messages, reducing the effective security it can provide.  In other words, Verisign is contributing to training people to ignore the validity of their own products and decreasing the value of their own business.  And NO ONE at Verisign seems to care enough to make this SIMPLE fix.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My bad.  Verisign STILL has not fixed their certificate problem.  <a href="https://www.verisign.net/" rel="nofollow">https://www.verisign.net/</a><br />
You may say &#8220;so what,&#8221; we know it&#8217;s them.  But DO you?  Man in the middle attack, phishing attacks, etc&#8230; it&#8217;s crazy stuff.  But what&#8217;s sad is that it just adds to &#8220;training&#8221; people to ignore such messages, reducing the effective security it can provide.  In other words, Verisign is contributing to training people to ignore the validity of their own products and decreasing the value of their own business.  And NO ONE at Verisign seems to care enough to make this SIMPLE fix.</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-866</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Sep 2005 04:59:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-866</guid>
		<description>Oh, and for some humor...
Verisign and SSL certs:
Up until a month ago, going to www.verisign.net resulted in an warning with the cert, saying that the cert was for the wrong domain (verisign.com).  It wasn&#039;t until shortly after someone well respected in the info security world embarrassed a Verisign rep at my group&#039;s strategy meeting with his demo of the failure, that Verisign finally fixed the problem.  It was just a perfect example of how even those supposedly acting as an authority isn&#039;t even doing things right.

And as for dealing with SSL certs... don&#039;t forget that they&#039;re more than just for encryption.  Most implementations, I&#039;ve found, don&#039;t even do the verification that a cert is valid according to a trusted CA, or that the data matches the request.

*sigh*  Working in the info security industry really makes me sad about the state of the industry.  Makes me feel good about my career and job security though.

Alex</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, and for some humor&#8230;<br />
Verisign and SSL certs:<br />
Up until a month ago, going to <a href="http://www.verisign.net" rel="nofollow">http://www.verisign.net</a> resulted in an warning with the cert, saying that the cert was for the wrong domain (verisign.com).  It wasn&#8217;t until shortly after someone well respected in the info security world embarrassed a Verisign rep at my group&#8217;s strategy meeting with his demo of the failure, that Verisign finally fixed the problem.  It was just a perfect example of how even those supposedly acting as an authority isn&#8217;t even doing things right.</p>
<p>And as for dealing with SSL certs&#8230; don&#8217;t forget that they&#8217;re more than just for encryption.  Most implementations, I&#8217;ve found, don&#8217;t even do the verification that a cert is valid according to a trusted CA, or that the data matches the request.</p>
<p>*sigh*  Working in the info security industry really makes me sad about the state of the industry.  Makes me feel good about my career and job security though.</p>
<p>Alex</p>
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		<title>By: Alex</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-865</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Sep 2005 04:41:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-865</guid>
		<description>Well, most of this story was fairly accurate.  But I have to say, I really disagree with many of the conclusions.  Having worked on many ends of the online credit card processing systems (from developing a recurring billing system for another web hosting company, to developing the fraud detection systems of an online CC processing company, to now working in an Info Sec group researching fraud detection and prevention for a large financial institution), I think the PROPER use of the CVV2 (whatever you wanna call them) helps reduce fraud.  Prevent?  No... reduce!  

There is no absolute protection against fraud.  But there are ways to mitigate and reduce the chances and impact.  Sure, if a company stores the CC number (which is required to be stored encrypted, by the way, by VISA regulations... I would recommend AES 128bit, and secure your keys) they may need to do recurring billing.  They don&#039;t NEED to use the CVV2.  In fact, it is a direct violation of regulations to store the CVV2, encrypted or not.  However, when they first collect the credit card from the customer, they can verify with added ensurance that the card collected is more likely the actual person.  Once verified the first time (after which you throw away the CVV2), you know the card HAD a valid CVV2 when collected.  This greatly reduces the pool of stolen cards that you may end up enabling fraud with. 

Perfect?  No.  But it cuts down the amount of fraud by a lot.  Sure, phishing attacks are collecting CVV2s as well.  Those people are more likely to be victims.  But at least if you properly use the CVV2 you can do YOUR part at protecting a large portion of people who have had their CC number stolen.

Do merhcants violate regulations?  Yes.  If YOU violate the regulations, I hope you fix things before you&#039;re caught.  There are more efforts being put in motion that can put business violating the regs out of business.  So... CVV2 use is not useless.  Nor does it &quot;not work&quot;.  It doesn&#039;t work absolutely, but it DOES work, and for a large portion.  There is no absolute solution.

I mean... does wearing a seat belt or having air bags ALWAYS protect you from being seriously injurred or killed in an accident?  No.  But most of us use them because more often it WILL.

For REAL information about good secure development practices, keep an eye on sites like OWASP (http://www.owasp.org/) and Threats&amp;Countermeasures (http://www.threatsandcountermeasures.com/).

So, in my opinion, I&#039;m not feeling safer with the comments of this blog entry.  It just says that DreamHost (if these are the practices in place) is enabling a higher potential of fraud through their systems by not recognizing the proper reasoning for security implementations of CC use and processing.  I mean really... I&#039;m all for challenging the &quot;security recommendations&quot; of regulatory groups, but only to a point of recognizing the flaw and actually identifying an improvement layer that can be applied to minimize the risk of their own flaws... not for rejecting the ideas entirely.


Defense in depth!

Alex</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, most of this story was fairly accurate.  But I have to say, I really disagree with many of the conclusions.  Having worked on many ends of the online credit card processing systems (from developing a recurring billing system for another web hosting company, to developing the fraud detection systems of an online CC processing company, to now working in an Info Sec group researching fraud detection and prevention for a large financial institution), I think the PROPER use of the CVV2 (whatever you wanna call them) helps reduce fraud.  Prevent?  No&#8230; reduce!  </p>
<p>There is no absolute protection against fraud.  But there are ways to mitigate and reduce the chances and impact.  Sure, if a company stores the CC number (which is required to be stored encrypted, by the way, by VISA regulations&#8230; I would recommend AES 128bit, and secure your keys) they may need to do recurring billing.  They don&#8217;t NEED to use the CVV2.  In fact, it is a direct violation of regulations to store the CVV2, encrypted or not.  However, when they first collect the credit card from the customer, they can verify with added ensurance that the card collected is more likely the actual person.  Once verified the first time (after which you throw away the CVV2), you know the card HAD a valid CVV2 when collected.  This greatly reduces the pool of stolen cards that you may end up enabling fraud with. </p>
<p>Perfect?  No.  But it cuts down the amount of fraud by a lot.  Sure, phishing attacks are collecting CVV2s as well.  Those people are more likely to be victims.  But at least if you properly use the CVV2 you can do YOUR part at protecting a large portion of people who have had their CC number stolen.</p>
<p>Do merhcants violate regulations?  Yes.  If YOU violate the regulations, I hope you fix things before you&#8217;re caught.  There are more efforts being put in motion that can put business violating the regs out of business.  So&#8230; CVV2 use is not useless.  Nor does it &#8220;not work&#8221;.  It doesn&#8217;t work absolutely, but it DOES work, and for a large portion.  There is no absolute solution.</p>
<p>I mean&#8230; does wearing a seat belt or having air bags ALWAYS protect you from being seriously injurred or killed in an accident?  No.  But most of us use them because more often it WILL.</p>
<p>For REAL information about good secure development practices, keep an eye on sites like OWASP (<a href="http://www.owasp.org/" rel="nofollow">http://www.owasp.org/</a>) and Threats&amp;Countermeasures (<a href="http://www.threatsandcountermeasures.com/)" rel="nofollow">http://www.threatsandcountermeasures.com/)</a>.</p>
<p>So, in my opinion, I&#8217;m not feeling safer with the comments of this blog entry.  It just says that DreamHost (if these are the practices in place) is enabling a higher potential of fraud through their systems by not recognizing the proper reasoning for security implementations of CC use and processing.  I mean really&#8230; I&#8217;m all for challenging the &#8220;security recommendations&#8221; of regulatory groups, but only to a point of recognizing the flaw and actually identifying an improvement layer that can be applied to minimize the risk of their own flaws&#8230; not for rejecting the ideas entirely.</p>
<p>Defense in depth!</p>
<p>Alex</p>
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		<title>By: Keaka</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-591</link>
		<dc:creator>Keaka</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2005 02:37:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-591</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote cite=&quot;josh&quot;&gt;or else they also have to store your CSC code… so it’ll get stolen too!&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;blockquote cite=&quot;&quot;&gt;Yeah well merchants can store the CSC codes anyway so it doesn’t really protect you.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

False.  Merchants are not allowed to store the CSC code, not even in an encrypted form.

The Payment Card Industry (PCI) data security standard prohibits the storage of the card-validation code.  See section 3.2.2 of the PCI standard.  Visa&#039;s Card Information Security Program (CISP) and Mastercard&#039;s equivalent program use the PCI standard and forbid the storage of CSC codes.

Storing the CSC code in any manner may result in large fines from Visa, Mastercard, and others, and is probably a violation of your merchant account agreement.

See the &lt;a href=&quot;http://usa.visa.com/download/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp_PCI_Data_Security_Standard.pdf?it=il&#124;/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp.html&#124;PCI%20Data%20Security%20Standard&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;PCI standard&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://usa.visa.com/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Visa&#039;s CISP&lt;/a&gt; for more information.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote cite="josh"><p>or else they also have to store your CSC code… so it’ll get stolen too!</p></blockquote>
<blockquote cite=""><p>Yeah well merchants can store the CSC codes anyway so it doesn’t really protect you.</p></blockquote>
<p>False.  Merchants are not allowed to store the CSC code, not even in an encrypted form.</p>
<p>The Payment Card Industry (PCI) data security standard prohibits the storage of the card-validation code.  See section 3.2.2 of the PCI standard.  Visa&#8217;s Card Information Security Program (CISP) and Mastercard&#8217;s equivalent program use the PCI standard and forbid the storage of CSC codes.</p>
<p>Storing the CSC code in any manner may result in large fines from Visa, Mastercard, and others, and is probably a violation of your merchant account agreement.</p>
<p>See the <a href="http://usa.visa.com/download/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp_PCI_Data_Security_Standard.pdf?it=il|/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp.html|PCI%20Data%20Security%20Standard" rel="nofollow">PCI standard</a> and <a href="http://usa.visa.com/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/cisp.html" rel="nofollow">Visa&#8217;s CISP</a> for more information.</p>
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		<title>By: GF</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-549</link>
		<dc:creator>GF</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2005 01:19:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-549</guid>
		<description>LOL, yea maybe use that useless DreamHost Information menu?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>LOL, yea maybe use that useless DreamHost Information menu?</p>
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		<title>By: James</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-548</link>
		<dc:creator>James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2005 01:17:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-548</guid>
		<description>Someone should post about this on the blog cuz not everyone got that link...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Someone should post about this on the blog cuz not everyone got that link&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: GF</title>
		<link>http://blog.dreamhost.com/2005/09/08/why-we-dont-use-csc-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-547</link>
		<dc:creator>GF</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2005 01:14:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dreamhost.com/?p=22#comment-547</guid>
		<description>Cool, tnx!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cool, tnx!</p>
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